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forty-five day demand he can forestall a motion to dismiss." 20
But such security is misleading. A defendant can demand that a
note of issue be filed within forty-five days. Afterwards, he can
seek a dismissal for the "general delay". which occurred prior to
the filing of the note of issue. Thus, by failing to timely file, a
plaintiff will play right into the hands of a defendant seeking a dismissal for "general delay." The net effect of this is that defendants are encouraged not to expedite the proceedings, but rather to
allow the plaintiff enough rope to hang himself.
Collateral Estoppel: Defensive assertion of collateral estoppel
allowed in suit involving joint tort-feasors.
Ten years ago, the Court of Appeals abolished the requirement of mutuality for the defensive assertion of collateral estoppel
in Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.191 Until recently, it did not appear
that the lower courts had applied the Israel decision to cases involving joint tort-feasors. Although the facts given by the court
are incomplete, it seems that the appellate division, fourth department, in Hires v. New York Central R.R.1 92 has applied Israel
to such a situation.
There, plaintiff's intestate was found to have been contributorily negligent in a prior suit against the State of New York
and, therefore, plaintiff was denied recovery. Plaintiff then sued
the New York Central on a cause of action arising out of the
same accident. The court held that "the prior judgment is a
complete defense and precludes the prosecution of the cause
herein." 193
This is a departure from the previous attitude of the lower
courts in applying the Israel doctrine. For example, in the July,
1966 issue of The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, a third
department decision, Cumrinitigs v. Dresher, was examined. The
court took great pains to show that there was no identity of
issues so that the holding of Israel could be avoided. 94
Davis, Jr., Volker Law, 156 N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
N.Y2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956). Collateral estoppel
insures that issues once litigated will be conclusive in a subsequent suit involving different causes of action or parties. Prior to the Israel case,
the courts imposed a requirement of mutuality in order to assert the estoppel.
Since non-parties and non-privies are not bound by a judgment, normally
they cannot attempt to benefit therefrom. Thus the party seeking to assert
collateral estoppel must have been either party or privy to the previous
action. The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. Joutds L. REv.
121, 148 (1966).
19223 App. Div. 2d 1075, 265 N.Y.S.2d 895 (4th Dep't 1965).
19s Hires v. New York Cent. M.R., 23 App. Div. 2d 1075, 265 N.Y.S.2d
895, 896 (4th Dep't 1965).
19424 App. Div. 2d 912, 264 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d Dep't 1965), as discussed
in The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S, L. REv.
190
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The Hires decision is both a logical development of Israel
and a desirable attitude for the courts to take. X sues A and
is denied recovery because of his own contributory negligence. If
X subsequently sues B, a joint tort-feasor, B should be permitted
to assert collateral estoppel to defeat the action. This follows
only if the contributory negligence in the first action is identical
to the contributory negligence that would be shown in the second
action. 95 It is apparent that plaintiff has had his day in court
on the issue of contributory negligence. Thus, there seems to be
no reason for not expanding the scope of the Israel decision to
situations of this type.
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CPLR 4404(b):

Codefendants do not have standing to set
verdict aside.
In an unreported decision, the jury returned a verdict against
defendants Petroff and Miszuk and in favor of defendant Brzezinski.
The trial court, upon a motion by the codefendants Petroff and
Miszuk, set aside all the verdicts, solely upon a determination
that the verdict in favor of Brzezinski was contrary to the weight
of the evidence.
In Petroff v. Brzezinski,19 the appellate division, fourth
department, interpreting CPLR 4404, reversed and reinstated the
original verdict. The court held that although the verdict in favor
of Brzezinski was contrary to the weight of the evidence, his codefendants had no standing to move to
set the verdict aside
197
"because they were not his adversaries."
It should be noted that the refusal of the court to hear the
motion defeats the codefendants' possible right to contribution
under CPLR 1401. Thus, Petroff and Miszuk are "aggrieved" to
the extent that they lose the chance to reduce their damages. They
121, 150 (1966).

However, this case has been reversed by the Court of

Appeals, and will be treated in the next issue of the Survey.
195

See also Friedman v. Parklane Motors, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 262,

238 N.Y.S2d 973 (1st Dep't 1963). The court permitted the defensive
assertion of collateral estoppel, after it had been established in a previous
action against a party not in privity with the defendant therein that plaintiff's
intestate's injuries had not been caused by the accident.
90624 App. Div. 2d 1072, 265 N.Y.S.2d 804 (4th Dep't 1965).
197 Petroff v. Brzezinski, 24 App. Div. 2d 1072, 1073, 265 N.Y.S.2d 804,
806 (4th Dep't 1965). Accord, Schultz v. Alfred, 11 App. Div. 2d 266,

203 N.Y.S.2d 201 (3d Dep't 1960); Hughes v. Parkhurst, 284 App. Div.
757, 134 N.Y.S.2d 798 (4th Dep't 1954).

